This paper considers a time-inconsistent stopping problem in which the inconsistency arises from non-constant time preference rates. We show that the smooth pasting principle, the main approach that has been used to construct explicit solutions for conventional time-consistent optimal stopping problems, may fail under time-inconsistency. Specifically, we prove that the smooth pasting principle solves a time-inconsistent problem within the intra-personal game theoretic framework if and only if a certain inequality on the model primitives is satisfied. We show that the violation of this inequality can happen even for very simple non-exponential discount functions. Moreover, we demonstrate that the stopping problem does not admit any intra-personal equilibrium whenever the smooth pasting principle fails. The "negative" results in this paper caution blindly extending the classical approaches for time-consistent stopping problems to their time-inconsistent counterparts.
Introduction
A crucial assumption on the conventional optimal stopping models is that a decision maker has a constant time preference rate and hence discounts his/her future payoff exponentially. When this assumption is violated, the optimal stopping problem becomes time-inconsistent in that any optimal stopping rule obtained today may not be optimal in the future. As is standard in the literature on decision making, time-inconsistent problems are often considered within the self-control and intra-personal game theoretic framework and the corresponding equilibria are taken as solutions to such problems. This paper studies a time-inconsistent stopping problem in continuous time. There are two key contributions in this paper. The first one is to demonstrate that a commonly used technique -that of the smooth pasting (SP) -in solving classical stopping problems may fail when time-consistency is lost. The second one is to formally establish a condition under which no equilibrium stopping rule exists. The results established in this paper are constructive and they caution blindly extending the SP principle to time-inconsistent stopping problems. These results provide insights to solving time-inconsistent stopping problems commonly found in finance and insurance.
Let us now focus on the first contribution. Recall that the SP principle is a main approach to deriving explicit solutions for conventional optimal stopping problems. When the objective function and underlying process satisfy some standard conditions, the SP principle yields a solution to the optimal stopping problem. Recently, Grenadier and Wang (2007) and Hsiaw (2013) , among others, extend the SP principle to solving time-inconsistent stopping problems. While the SP happened to work in the specific settings of these works, this paper, for the first time, cautions the use of SP in solving time-inconsistent stopping problems. Unlike the conventional stopping problems, the SP principle may fail under time-inconsistency, even for very simple stopping problems. To highlight this issue, we consider a model in which the state process is a geometric Brownian motion and the cost functional includes both a running cost and a terminal cost. Moreover, the time preference is modeled by a weighted average of a set of exponential functions in order to induce the time-inconsistency (see Ebert et al. 2016) . With this setup, we prove that while the SP principle always yields a candidate solution, the latter actually solves our stopping problem if and only if a certain inequality on the model primitives is satisfied. In other words, we cannot apply the SP blindly to any given model when time-inconsistency is present. Indeed, the violation of such an inequality is not rare. For some behavioral discount functions, including the pseudo-exponential discount function (Ekeland and Lazrak 2006; Karp 2007; Harris and Laibson 2013) , the inequality may not hold for plausible sets of parameter values of the chosen discount functions.
The second contribution is about the possible nonexistence of the intra-personal equilibrium. For a time-consistent stopping problem, optimal stopping rules exist when the cost functional and the underlying process satisfy some mild regularity conditions (see, e.g., Peskir and Shiryaev 2006) . However, this is no longer the case for the timeinconsistent counterpart. In a similar setting, we prove that no equilibrium stopping rule exists whenever the aforementioned inequality and hence the SP principle fails. Consequently, our result shows that desirable stopping rules within the intra-personal game theoretic framework may not exist no matter what regularity conditions are imposed on the underlying models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of time preferences and formulates the time-inconsistent stopping problem within the intrapersonal game theoretic framework. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium stopping rule by a Bellman system and provides the verification theorem. Then we solve the Bellman system by the SP principle and formally establish the inequality without which the SP solution is not an equilibrium. Section 4 shows the nonexistent result and Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs are collected in Appendix A.
The Model

Time preferences
Throughout this paper we consider weighted discount functions defined as follows. (2.1)
F is called the weighting distribution of h.
Many commonly used discount functions can be represented in weighted form. For instance, exponential function h(t) = e −rt , r > 0 (Samuelson 1937 ) and pseudo-exponential function h(t) = δe −rt + (1 − δ)e −(r+λ)t , 0 < δ < 1, r > 0, λ > 0 (Ekeland and Lazrak 2006; Karp 2007) , can be obtained via degenerated and binary distributions respectively. As a more complicated example, the generalized hyperbolic discount function (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992) with parameters γ > 0, β > 0 can be written as
denotes the density function of the Gamma distribution with parameters k and θ and Γ(k) = ∞ 0 x k−1 e −x dx represents the Gamma function evaluated at k. See Ebert et al. (2016) for more examples and discussions about the types of discount functions that are of weighted form.
The following well-known Bernstein's theorem provides a characterization of weighted discount functions in terms of the signs of all order derivatives.
Theorem 2.2 (Bernstein 1928 ) A discount function h is a weighted discount function if and only if it is continuous on [0, ∞), infinitely differentiable on (0, ∞), and satisfies (−1) n h (n) (t) ≥ 0, for all non-negative integers n and for all t > 0.
Bernstein's theorem can be used to examine whether a given function is a weighted discount function. For example, the constant sensitivity discount function h(t) = e −at k , a, k > 0, and the constant absolute decreasing impatience discount function h(t) = e e −ct −1 , c > 0 are both weighted discount functions.
Stopping rules and equilibrium
We denote stopping rules and the corresponding stopping times as follows.
Definition 2.3 A stopping rule is a measurable function of time and the process value
where 0 indicates "continue" and 1 indicates "stop". For any given process X = {X t } t≥0 , a stopping rule u defines a flow of stopping
Let the dynamics of an underlying process X = {X t } t≥0 be given by
At a calendar time t, an agent considers the following cost functional
where u is the stopping rule applied at t, h is a weighted discount function with corresponding weighting distribution F and K is a positive constant. In economics, this type of cost functional can be used to analyze when to abandon an ongoing project for a decision maker with a time-inconsistent preference. See Dixit (2013) for the time-consistent counterpart of this problem.
In (2.6), the integrand depends explicitly on the current time t due to the nonseparability of a non-exponential h in the sense that h(s − t) = h(s)h(t) −1 . As a result, any agent looking for an optimal strategy at each time encounters a time inconsistent problem: the optimal stopping rule itself changes over time. In this paper we consider a sophisticated, non-committed agent, that is, the agent is aware of the time-inconsistency but unable to control his future actions. In this case, he seeks to find a so-called equilibrium strategy within the intra-personal game theoretic framework, in which the individual is represented by different players at different dates. A current self formulates an optimal stopping rule taking as constraints the stopping rules chosen by future selves.
Given the infinite horizon of the cost functional (2.6) and the stationarity of the underlying process X, as standard in literature (e.g. Grenadier and Wang 2007; Ekeland et al. 2012; Harris and Laibson 2013.) , we need to consider only stationary stopping rules, which means the stopping rule u is a function of the state variable x only. To see this, let us rewrite the cost functional (2.6) as follows:
From the above, we can see that each future self t faces the same problem that depends only on the state variable x. For this reason, the cost functional can be rewitten with the time variable t suppressed:
An equilibrium stopping ruleû can now be regarded as a solution to a game in which each self of the agent at time t is a player such that no selves is willing to deviate from u. 1 Definition 2.4 (Equilibrium stopping rule) The stopping ruleû is an equilibrium
(2.9)
In the rest of the paper, we impose the following technical assumption on discount functions h or equivalently their weighting distributions F .
This is a mild regularity assumption ensuring that the explicit solution obtained subsequently is finite and the interchangeability of integration and differentiation is valid.
It is satisfied by many discount functions such as the generalized hyperbolic discount function (2.2) whenever α < β, which will be discussed in this section, as well as the pseudo-exponential discount function, to be discussed in the next section.
Equilibrium characterization
Let us first characterize the equilibrium stopping rule by a Bellman system. w(x; r)dF (r). Suppose that V is continuously differentiable and its first order derivative is absolutely continuous. If (V, w,û) solves
Then,û is an equilibrium stopping rule and the value function of the problem is given by V (x), i.e., V (x) = J(x;û).
The proof to the above proposition and all subsequent propositions and corollaries are collected in Appendix A.
In the classical literature on (time-consistent) stopping, optimal solutions are often obtained by the SP principle since the candidate solution from the SP principle must solve the Bellman system (and hence the optimal stopping problem) whenever some mild conditions, such as the smoothness and convexity of the pay-off functions, are satisfied.
In economics terms, SP principle amounts to the matching of the marginal payoff at the stopping threshold; hence some economists apply the SP principle without even explicitly introducing the Bellman system. However, as will be shown in the rest of the section, in the presence of time-inconsistency the SP principle may not yield a solution to the Bellman system (and therefore not to the stopping problem within the game theoretic framework), no matter how smooth and convex the pay-off functions might be.
An explicit solution
We first attempt to seek a solution to the Bellman system by the SP principle. As is well known, the SP starts with an Ansatz that assumes the agent stops whenever the value of the underlying process X is greater or equal to x * . In this case, x * is known as the triggering boundary, which is identified as follows.
First, for any r, it follows from Feynman-Kac formula that w satisfies the following differential equation in (0, x * ),
with the value matching conditions:
w(x * ; r) = K, w(0; r) = 0.
Then it follows that
Since V is the weighted average of w, we have
which in turn implies that Inequality (3.5) is a condition on the model primitives we must verify before we can apply the SP principle to construct explicit equilibrium solutions to the time-inconsistent stopping problem. It is easy to see that (3.5) is satisfied when the distribution function F is degenerated. This reconciles with the time-consistent setting. The next result shows that (3.5) also holds for some non-exponential discount functions.
Corollary 3.4 Suppose that the discount function h is a generalized hyperbolic discount function, that is,
dr, γ > 0, β > 0.
If γ < β ≤ σ 2 2 , then (3.5) holds, in which case the triggering boundary x * is given by
A nonexistence result
The preceding section shown that the SP principle does not yield a solution to the time inconsistent stopping problem whenever Inequality (3.5) is not satisfied. It is therefore of significant interest to investigate if the time inconsistent stopping problem admits any other solutions that can not be characterized by the SP principle or the Bellman system? The answer to this is provided in the following proposition: So this is an enahnced result: for the problem to have any equilibrium stopping role (not necesarrily the one obtained by the SP principle), the condition (3.5) must hold.
To conclude this section, we present the following corollary which asserts that even for the pseudo-exponential discount functions -the simplest class of non-exponential weighted discount functions, an equilibrium stopping policy may not exist. 
Conclusion
While the SP principle has been widely used to study time-inconsistent stopping problems, our results indicate risk of using this principle on such problems. By a simple model, we have shown that the SP principle solves the time inconsistent problem if and only if a certain inequality on the model primitives is satisfied. Unfortunately, this inequality may be violated even for a simple non-exponential discount function.
When the SP principle fails, we have shown the intra-personal equilibrium does not exist. The nonexistence result and the failure of the SP principle suggest that it is imperative that the techniques for conventional optimal stopping problems be used more carefully when extended to solving time-inconsistent stopping problems.
A Appendix: proofs
For convenience, in this appendix we define S u = {x ∈ (0, ∞) : u(x) = 1}. For any limit point x ∈ (0, ∞) of S u , since the underlying process X is a non-degenerate diffusion, then it follows from standard literature (e.g., Chapter 3 of Ito and McKean Jr 1965 .) that P(τ u = 0|X 0 = x) = 1, and hence J(x; u) = 0. This means at any point of S u , the agent will stop immediately. We also define C u = (0, ∞) ∩S u c .
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The intuition and the proof of this proposition are adapted from Ebert et al. (2016) .
It is first useful to present the following two lemmas.
Lemma A.1 For any stopping rule u, the cost functional J has linear growth, i.e.,
Proof. This is a result of the following calculation, Proof. We consider the right continuity of E(·; u, r) at x 0 > 0. The left continuity can be discussed in the same way.
1. If there exists a δ > 0 such that (x 0 , x 0 + δ) ∈ C u or S u , then the right continuity of E(·; u, r) at x 0 is obtained immediately.
2. Otherwise, we first suppose x 0 ≥ rK and consider the open set C u ∩ (x 0 , ∞).
In the one dimensional case, we have that C u ∩ (x 0 , ∞) = ∪ n≥1 (a n , b n ), where a n , b n ∈S u , ∀n ≥ 1. It is to see that x 0 is a accumulation point of {a n } n≥1 and hence x 0 ∈S u Consider the function I(x) := E(·; u, r)−K on (a n , b n ). By the standard argument, it is easy to see that I solves the following differential equation,
with the boundary conditions, I(a n ) = I(b n ) = 0.
Consider an auxiliary function H which solves the following differential equation
with the boundary conditions,
Since x > rK on (x 0 , ∞), the comparison principle shows that H(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [x 0 , b 1 ]. Using comparison principle again on any (a n , b n ) ∩ (x 0 , b 1 ), ∀n ∈ N + , we have that 0 ≤ I(x) ≤ H(x). Then H(x) → H(x 0 ) = 0 yields that I(·) is right continuous at x 0 and the right continuity of E(·; u, r) follows immediately.
For the case x 0 < rK, it is easy to see that the same argument as above also applies. In fact, consider the auxiliary function H 1 which satisfies the differential equation (A.2) in (x 0 , rK) with the boundary condition H 1 (x 0 ) = H 1 (rK) = 0.
The comparison principle yields that H(x) ≤ I(x) ≤ 0 on (a n , b n ) ∩ (x 0 , rK), ∀n ∈ N + . Then the right continuity of I(·) and E(·; u, r) follows immediately.
This completes the proof.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 3.1. For the stopping ruleû ǫ,a , if a = 1, then J(x; u ǫ,a ) = K. The Bellman equation (3.1) shows that V (x) ≤ K. This yields (2.8).
If a = 0, we have that
The growth condition ( rw(x; r)dF (r)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
We begin with the sufficiency. To show that the triplet (V ǫ (x), w ǫ (x; r),û(x)) solves the Bellman system, it remains to verify
Let us first verify the inequality (A.5).
Since V (x) = w(x; r) = K, x ≥ x * , then (A.5) becomes
KrdF (r), which follows from Inequality (3.5) immediately.
For (A.6), let us consider V xx on (0, x * ). Note that
Then we have that
Note that both α(r) and rK − x * are increasing functions of r and x < x * , then the rearangement inequality (e.g., Hardy et al. 1952; Lehmann et al. 1966 ) yields that
Plugging the representation (3.4) of x * into above inequality, we have V xx < 0 on (0, x * ) by Inequality (3.5).
Finally, it follows from the SP principle that V is strictly increasing in (0, x * ). This fact, combined with the V (x * ) = K, yields that V < K, x < x * .
We now turn to the necessary condition. If Inequality (3.5) does not hold, then by simple calculation, we have that V xx (x * −) > 0. Then the SP principle V x (x * ) = 0 and V (x * ) = K yields that V > K in a left neighborhood of x * , which shows that the triplet (V ǫ , w ǫ ,û) does not solve the Bellman system. This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 3.3
Lemma A.3 Supposeû is an equilibrium stopping rule, then J(x;û) ≤ K, ∀x ∈ (0, ∞).
Proof. If there exists x 0 ∈ (0, ∞) such that J(x 0 ;û) > K, then we have
whereû ǫ,1 is given by (2.9).
This contradicts the definition of an equilibrium stopping rule and thus completes the proof.
The sufficiency is an immediate result of Proposition 3.1.
We now turn to the necessary condition. From the proof of Proposition 3.2, we have that there exists x ∈ C, such that J(x;û) > K if Inequality (3.5) does not hold. Then the necessity follows from Lemma A.3.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3.4
It follows from γ < β that Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Then it suffices to verify Inequality (3.5).
Note that α(r) − 1 = − 1 2 + 1 4 σ 4 +2σ 2 r σ 2 is a concave function, then we have
Moreover, it is easy to see that Then the result follows from the fact that (1 − δ)(r + λ)δ( α(r)−1 r ) grows faster than δα(r) + (1 − δ)α(r + λ) in λ.
